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Abstract 
Emissions from vessels affect individual’s health and the environment. In the year 
2000 emissions from the shipping industry was responsible for approximately 
49500 premature deaths and the extern costs associated with individual’s health 
reaching a total of 7% of Europe’s total health costs. To reduce the amount of 
pollution from the shipping industry Emission Control Areas (ECA) has been 
implemented. This paper will examine the effect of the new ECA regulation that 
entered into force on the first of January 2015 and oil prices on the amount of 
Sulphur emitted. To do this we will be using data received form Marine 
Benchmark, the forefront of shipping data. We find a significant effect of the new 
ECA regulation as well as a fuel price effect on the amount of Sulphur released. 
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1. Introduction 
Emissions from vessels at sea have a negative impact on individual’s health and the 
environment. Exposure to Sulphur dioxide (SO2) impacts the body’s respiratory system which 
can cause asthma or even premature death (EPA 2016; WHO 2005). There are also 
environmental effects from emissions that cause global warming and environmental 
degradation (WWF Magazine, 2010). An article written by The Guardian in 2009 talks about 
the worrisome research discovery showing that one large container ship using a low-grade 
bunker fuel can emit as much harmful pollution as 50 million cars together (Evans, 2009). 
There was also an article in the Daily Mail reporting that 16 of the world’s biggest vessels 
emit as much Sulphur as all the cars in the world, which in 2009 was estimated to 800 million 
cars (Pearce, 2009).  
 
Areas at sea called “Emission Control Areas” (ECA) have been introduced for the purpose of 
reducing the amount of toxic gases released into the atmosphere from shipping. Regulations 
within the shipping industry change regularly in response to the huge effect of pollution 
caused by vessels. The 1 of January 2015 a new ECA regulation entered into force, which 
prohibits vessels operating inside an ECA to use marine fuel with a mass ratio of more than 
0.1% Sulphur per ton, adjusted from the previous cap of 1.0% (IMO, 2016).  
 
The subject of vessel emissions and ECA’s is not something new there have been a few 
papers written about this, among those are Nugraha (2009). Technological advances the resent 
years have made it possible for the gathering of more accurate data on the shipping industry 
on a global scale. Thanks to the data we have received from Marine Benchmark AB (MBAB), 
one of the leading companies in the world when it comes to accumulating vessel data, we are 
now able to make more accurate calculations.  
 
This paper will examine i) the effect of the new ECA regulation, imposed by the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO), thru an analysis of total amount of Sulphur emitted before and 
after the regulation. ii) The paper will also examine the effect of the price of Marine Gas Oil 
(MGO), iii) specific vessel routes and the share of distance travelled inside the ECA on 
Sulphur emissions. iv) The Energy Efficiency Operational Indicator (EEOI) will also be 
calculated to see how the new regulation has affected the efficiency of vessels through total 
Sulphur emitted per unit work. Mellqvist and Beecken (2015) found that 2 out of 10 vessels 
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do not follow the regulation that is why we have v) generated a hypothetical non-compliance 
analysis to investigate potential shipping profits from skirting the regulations and the negative 
externalities associated with increased emission. One of the arguments behind vessels skirting 
the regulation is the price difference between the fuel used inside ECA and the fuel used 
outside ECA, containing a higher Sulphur level per ton. The shipping industry is having a 
hard time measuring if and how many vessels are skirting the new regulation due to the lack 
of accuracy and geographical coverage of monitoring and enforcement methods. The current 
methods are limited by only being able to measure close to ports and near shores whereas 
ECA violations are most likely to occur far from the coast or at sea (Marine Benchmark and 
Brodin, 2016). We found a significant effect of the new ECA regulation as well as a fuel price 
effect on the amount of Sulphur released. There was also increased efficiency (EEOI) on 2 out 
of the 3 routes examined. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows; the second section contains the background covering 
areas as environment, health, IMO and rules of emission, Emission Control Areas (ECA), 
different means of compliance, and enforcement and monitoring. The third section continues 
with a discussion of economic theories which we touch upon. Section 4 is the explanation of 
the data. Result is the 5th section, section 6 concludes and section 7 is discussion on future 
ECA’s.   
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2. Background 
 
The Effects of Sulphur on the Environment and Health 
 
2.1 Environment 
Emissions from large vessels contributes to global warming as well as environmental 
degradation as shown in the study conducted by the US Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) from 2010. The emissions from vessels can have a degradational impact as far inland 
as the Grand Canyon, roughly 800 km (WWF Magazine, 2010).    
  
The emissions can cause problems for the terrestrial ecosystems thru acidification of the soil 
vegetation, plants and crops. When SO2 is released into the atmosphere it reacts with oxygen 
and hydrogen particles (e.g water particles, ozone) forming Sulphuric acid (SMHI, 2012). 
This creates acid rain1 that falls over the terrestrial ecosystem and acidifying the environment, 
the same effect occurs when Sulphur particles are carried inland by the wind. The study 
conducted by J. Lee et. al from 1980 focused on the effect of Sulphuric acid rain on crops and 
different types of plants. Their results show that acid rain affects both the foliage and growth 
of roots. In their sample the foliage was damaged on 31 of the 35 plants examined at the pH 
level of 3. 
 
Aquatic ecosystems are also damaged by Sulphur oxides (SOx)2 emitted by vessels. The 
emissions cause acidification in the oceans that harms the marine ecosystem. The lowering of 
the pH –value in the ocean hinders the crustaceans in the oceans to use the calcium carbonate 
in the water to create a hard exoskeleton (European Commission, 2013; Carlowicz, 2008).  
 
2.2 Health 
It is estimated that 70% of vessels emissions occur within 400 km from the coastline 
(Nugraha, 2009) and since emissions can travel roughly 800 km it is safe to say that populated 
areas will be affected. Individuals exposed to these acidic particles will experience negative 
health impacts. According to current scientific evidence there is correlation between short-
term exposure to SO2 and several negative respiratory effects. Short-term exposure varies 
																																								 																				
1	Rain with lower pH-value than normal, caused by emission particles	
2	SOx	is	e.g.	SO2,SO3 or SO4	
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from 5 minutes to 24 hours and the respiratory effects include increased asthma symptoms as 
well as bronchoconstriction (EPA, 2016; WHO, 2005).   
 
Even premature death can be caused by the different gaseous of Sulphur oxides, particularly 
through increased distress of existing heart diseases. If the SOx gases were to compound with 
other particles in the atmosphere, creating smaller particles, these smaller particles could then 
potentially reach the more sensitive parts of the lungs. If these particles reach the sensitive 
parts of the lungs respiratory diseases can emerge or be worsened, such diseases include 
bronchitis and emphysema (EPA, 2016). 
 
According to a study conducted by Arden Pope III, et. al from 2002, where they examined the 
effect of fine particulate air pollution on health. They found a correlation between mortality 
and air pollution. The participants of the study were approximately 500 000 adults above the 
age of 30 living in metropolitan areas spread across all 50 states in America. The study shows 
that SO2 and other fine particulate air pollution particles examined affects cardiopulmonary, 
lung cancer and mortality.  
 
In a paper from 2011 by J.Brandt et al. a study was conducted to analyze the effect that 
international ship traffic had on both premature deaths and external costs caused by emission 
related to health in Europe. According to J.Brandt et al. (2011) in the year of 2000, before the 
ECAs was introduced, the international shipping industry was responsible for approximately 
49500 premature deaths and the external costs created by emissions on individuals health 
reaching a total of 7% of Europe’s total health costs (58 billion Euros/year).  
 
2.3 IMO and Regulations on Pollutants     
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is an autonomous organization working 
together with the United Nation to regulate shipping on a global level. In 1973 a marine 
environmental convention called the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships often referred to as MARPOL 73/78 was adopted to reduce the pollutions by 
vessels. The convention was signed in 1973 and modified in 1978, therefore the name 
MARPOL 73/78. In April 2016, 154 states in collaboration with MARPOL represented 
98.7% of the world’s total shipping tonnage3 (IMO 6, 2016).  
																																								 																				
3	Shipping tonnage is a vessels measurement of the total cargo-carrying capacity.	
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There are numerous negative externalities associated with the shipping industry e.g. pollution 
by oil, noxious liquid substances, sewage, garbage from vessels and air pollution. MARPOL 
was divided into six different Annexes in order to regulate these different categories (IMO 1, 
2016). Annex VI is the one focused in this thesis. The prevention of air pollution from vessels 
entered into force on the 19 of May 2005. The emissions that this regulation aims to control 
are the amount of Sulphur oxides and Nitrogen oxides emitted by vessels burning marine fuel 
(IMO 1, 2016).  
 
2.4 Emission Control Area 
Reducing emissions is paramount to alleviate the negative externalities from vessel emissions 
that effect the environment and individual’s health. An ECA is an area at sea where different 
regulations have been set to control the amount of toxic gases emitted into the atmosphere e.g. 
SOx and NOx. The ECA’s are allowed to extend as far as a state’s Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) reaches. The economic zone is set at a maximum distance of 200 nautical miles from 
the coast. An EEZ refers to an area were a state is allowed to explore and exploit the resources 
found within. The use of these EEZ can vary from the excavation of natural resources to the 
use of waves, winds and currents to produce energy (UN, 2013). 
 
The first ECA entered into force 2005 in the 
Baltic Sea and the limit of emission by SOx and 
particulate matter was 1.5%4. The second ECA 
to be implemented was in the North Sea, 
established in 2005/2006, with the same SOx 
limit. A representation of the Northern 
European ECA can be found in Diagram 1. On 
July first 2010 the Sulphur cap was changed 
from 1.5% to 1.0%. There have also been 
changes to the Sulphur cap outside of ECA’s. 
After the first of January 2012 the cap was 
changed from 4.5% to 3.5% (IMO 3, 2016; 
IMO 4, 2015).  
 
																																								 																				
4	All the percentage caps referring to fuel is measured by % m/m - is % by mass 	
   Diagram 1: Baltic and North Sea ECA 
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One of the main reasons for introducing an ECA on the North and Baltic Sea was to minimize 
the hazardous effect of maritime emissions, particularly Sulphur oxides. The leading 
argument supporting the ECA regulation was to protect the well-being of the European 
citizens living and working in the affected areas. “The Strategy aims at significantly reducing 
premature deaths caused by air pollution by 2020 whilst simultaneously resolving 
environmental impacts such as acidification and eutrophication and associated losses in 
biodiversity” (Marine Benchmark and Brodin, 2016).	 
 
North America enforced an ECA on the first of 
August 2012, followed by the U.S Caribbean 
Sea on the first of January 2014. A figure on 
the North American and Caribbean ECA can 
be seen in Diagram 2 (IMO 7, 2012).  
 
The first of January 2015 the limit of SOx 
emissions and other particle matter within 
European and American ECA’s was set to 
0.1%. The new regulation will reduce 
emissions caused by vessels substantially. 
There have been discussions regarding the adjustment of the global Sulphur cap outside of 
ECA’s. The global Sulphur cap will be reduced from 3.5% to 0.5%. A review will take place 
in 2018 deciding when the implementation will be put into force (IMO 4, 2015).  
         
2.5 Different means of Compliance  
The introduction of ECAs is the most expensive regulation that the shipping industry has 
encountered to this day (Marine Benchmark and Brodin, 2016). Shipping companies in 
Europe are concerned that some vessel operators will gain a competitive advantage through 
non-compliance. This will in turn lead to companies outcompeting EU-based quality shipping 
companies (Marine Benchmark and Brodin, 2016; World Maritime News, 2015). Compliance 
to the ECA rules requires swapping from high Sulphur Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) containing a 
Sulphur level of 3.5% to low Sulphur fuel, e.g Marine Gas Oil (MGO) or Ultra Low Sulphur 
Fuel Oil (ULSFO), both acceptable within ECAs due to their 0.1% Sulphur limit.  
 
   Diagram 2: North American and Caribbean ECA 
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Another acceptable alternative besides switching the fuel is the use of a Scrubber. A Scrubber 
is an installment to the exhaust system that decreases the emission of SO2. There are different 
types of Scrubbers e.g. seawater and freshwater scrubbers. The SO2 particles in the exhaust 
gas react with a mixture of water and limestone, absorbing SO2 from being released into the 
atmosphere (Duke Energy, 2016). According to a study made by Andersen and Mayer (2007), 
the absorption capacity can reduce the amount of Sulphur released by 66%. Andersen and 
Mayer (2007) also note that the absorption capacity of the scrubbers is affected by e.g. 
salinity, temperature and alkalinity and can therefore have a varied effect. The higher the 
levels of salinity and alkalinity in the water combined with lower temperature results in better 
absorption capacity. 
 
The paper by Boen and Hoen (2015) stated that it is not common place to install a scrubber on 
older vessels due to the high retrofit costs. It is more common to fit scrubbers on newer 
vessels. The cost range for installing a scrubber varies from 200-400 EUR/kW 
(Euro/kilowatts). There are also annually maintenance costs and they vary depending on the 
type of scrubber. A freshwater scrubber is more expensive to install and maintain, due to the 
higher investment cost and caustic soda5 consumption (Boen and Hoen, 2015). This compared 
to a seawater scrubber which takes advantage of the salinity and alkalinity from the water in 
the ocean. Investing in a scrubber can be very expensive and depends on the vessels engine 
power. Factors influencing the decision of whether or not to install a scrubber are the oil 
prices and amount of time spent inside an ECA.  
 
After a meeting held the 27th of November 2014 in Vienna for the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries, the oil price plunged as a result for not reaching an agreement at the 
meeting (The Economist, E.L. 2014). From the 24th of November and until the 8th of February 
2016 the oil price has dropped from 76.67 dollars per barrel6 to 29.22 dollars which is 
approximately 262% (Trading View, 2016).  Given the substantial drop in the oil price since 
the entry of the new ECA regulation, it has been more cost efficient to switch fuel rather than 
install an expensive scrubber.   
 
 
																																								 																				
5	Caustic soda is mixed with the fresh water to increase the salinity and alkalinity of the freshwater, resulting in 
an increased absorption capacity 
6	A barrel is 158,987 liters 
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2.6 Enforcement and Monitoring 
Current enforcement and monitoring methods are very restricted by measuring accuracy as 
well as operational and geographical coverage. Violations of the ECA regulations are most 
likely to occur far off the coast and at sea. This results in the current monitoring systems 
having issues measuring vessel compliance due to the monitoring being confined to areas 
close to ports and near shores (Marine Benchmark and Brodin, 2016). The lack of monitoring 
accuracy and the potential for economic gains when not complying will undoubtedly lead to 
ship-owners being tempted to skirt the regulations (Trident Alliance, February 2016 and 
March 2016).  
 
The current monitoring methods available are either thru inspections or the use of devices 
such as Sniffers and DOAS. Inspections occur on the vessels when they arrive at port 
however far from every vessel is inspected. The process of inspecting a vessel is done by 
looking at the mandatory registration of oil purchases and then comparing to see if there is 
any discrepancy between the fuel purchased and the fuel used. This method gives a very 
accurate measurement of compliance however it is time consuming and the risk of non-
compliance is high since few vessels are inspected (Marine Benchmark and Brodin, 2016). 
 
Another variant of a sniffer has been developed by Chalmers University of Technology that 
measures the level of Sulphur dioxide content in vessels exhaust gas, using optical remote 
sensing. Optical remote sensing is a very complex technique of measuring gas emission; in 
simplified terms it measures molecular vibration in gases to establish the amount of Sulphur 
in the fuel. Chalmers conducted an experiment placing a sniffer at an inlet to Gothenburg. Out 
of the 200 vessels passing the inlet, almost half of them complied with the new regulation. 
Professor in optical remote sensing Johan Mellqvist said, “To many vessels had emission 
levels reaching just above the limit, due to certain uncertainty in the method of measuring, 
80% of the vessels can be considered to pass the new regulation” (Mellqvist and Beecken, 
2015).  
 
DOAS technique is a way to measure different wavelength of light passing from emitted 
gases. This technique however is dependent on solar light, which makes it non applicable at 
night. The instruments needed for this monitoring and enforcement technique is a telescope, 
Automatic Identification System (AIS), UV spectrometer and a computer (Nugraha, 2009). 
All of the techniques mentioned in this section lack the essentials to be an effective 
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monitoring method. An effective method would be one that is not confined to the close 
proximity of land and can still able to give accurate measurements of emissions. This will be 
covered more in the discussion part of our paper. 
 
 
3. Economic Theories  
The economic theories that this paper will be taking into consideration are the following: 
Negative externalities, environmental regulation in form of Command and Control, Porter 
Hypothesis and the theory of profit maximizing.   
 
A negative externality is a non-beneficial externality having an impact on a third party who 
does not participate in neither the consumption or production of a product e.g. the pollutants 
released from vessels when transporting oil have a negative impact on individuals and or the 
environment (Economics Fundamental Finance, n.d.). There are several negative externalities 
associated with the shipping industry; the main focus of this paper is the emission from fuel 
burnt by vessels. It has long been known that emission from different means of transport e.g. 
airplanes, trucks, and ships have a negative effect on individual’s health and the environment. 
By the introduction of the new ECA regulation, there is a clear aim to reduce these negative 
externalities caused by the shipping industry. The introduction of ECA’s has created the 
possibility thru non-compliance to affect the market. By not complying with the regulation 
profits can be made and in turn be used to create competitive advantages. With the profits 
gained an operator can reduce the price for shipping cargo, this will result in an imperfect 
market were some businesses have a competitive advantage purely through skirting the ECA 
regulation. 
 
Economic policies can be introduced to regulate the amount of Sulphur released such as taxes 
or subsidies. However IMO has decided to use Command and Control to regulate emissions. 
The theory of Command and Control (CAC) regulation is when a state or organization targets 
to regulate some aspect of an industry by establishing laws (Econ Port, 2006). CAC is an 
efficient method of regulation for the shipping industry due to the high amounts of toxic 
pollutants released on a global scale. These emissions include toxic gases such as Sulphur. 
The pollutants from vessels affect both individuals and the environment; this is why emissions 
need to be reduced even if the cost to the industry will increase. The instillation of ECA is a 
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form of regulation, put into force by IMO, affecting the entire shipping industry and therefore 
classified as a Command and Control regulation. The purpose of introducing regulations such 
as ECA’s and a global emission cap was to decrease the effect of emission caused by the 
shipping industry. When enforcing a new regulation there is a risk of non-compliance, due to 
increased costs; in this case vessel operators have to use more expensive marine fuel e.g. 
MGO. These additional costs can be avoided by skirting the regulation by using the cheaper 
fuel HFO. Hence it should be a priority to eliminate non-complying vessels from skirting the 
regulation using proper monitoring and enforcement methods, failure to control the regulation 
will result in a diminished effect.  
  
Porter Hypothesis states that environmental regulations can lead to improved competition, 
efficiency, as well as new innovations (Go Green, n.d.). New regulations will put pressure on 
a market to adjust and this can in turn result in an increased demand for new and more 
efficient innovations.	The introduction of the ECA regulations has forced fuel companies to 
change their production methods when creating MGO fuel to reduce the amount of Sulphur in 
the oil. This new production method allows a new hybrid oil. New oil is not the only 
innovation to come from regulations in the shipping industry, there are also scrubbers for 
vessels. As previously mentioned the scrubbers are used to reduce the amount of Sulphur 
released by vessels by modifying the exhaust system. Whether or not this has led to a more 
competitive and efficient market remains to be seen. The negative effect of new innovations is 
usually that the costs are initially high. Such costs can include more expensive oil or choosing 
to install a scrubber. The shipping industry will see this as an expensive and shocking cost at 
first; however the market will adjust with time. 
 
With the new regulation in place all vessels operating inside an ECA have to make the 
decision between buying low Sulphur fuel MGO or investing in a Scrubber. The operators 
will choose the most cost efficient alternative to maximize their profits, this is in line with the 
economic theory that companies are profit maximizers (Pettinger, 2011). The factors affecting 
the decision between the two are the amount of time spent inside an ECA and the oil price. It 
should also be noted that the shipping industry is a profit maximizing industry and therefore 
CAC regulations will tempt vessel operators to not comply and in turn increase their profits.   
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4. Data 
The data contains 619 observations and the observations represent vessel voyages. The data in 
the paper was received from the company Marine Benchmark AB (MBAB). The voyage data 
was collected thru an Automatic Identification System called AIS, a vessel tracking system. 
Vessels with AIS transmitters transmit data of their location, speed and identity to other AIS 
equipped vessels, satellites and AIS stations.  
 
4.1 Variables  
The different vessel types included in the data set are Suezmax and Aframax. The difference 
between Suezmax and Aframax is the size. Suezmax is the bigger vessel with a deadweight 
interval between approximately 120 000 - 200 000 tons, whilst Aframax is between 80 000 - 
120 000 tons. The vessels examined in the paper were selected from three specific routes 
within a specific time period, determined by the date of departure, and the specific vessel 
types Aframax and Suezmax. The first voyage of the data set departs on the 21 of December 
2013 and the last voyage departs on the 27 of January 2016. The majority of the voyages are 
intentionally distributed among the years of 2014 and 2015 and divided into three routes. The 
reason for this is to test what the effect of the new regulation has been, to do this we needed 
observations before and after the new regulation. The route between Russia and Rotterdam 
was chosen because the voyages are only located inside of ECA. The two other routes Nigeria 
and Venezuela were selected mainly for their voyage duration and the fact that the vessels 
depart from outside an ECA. 
 
The voyages from the first route depart from either Primorsk or Ust-Luga (Russia) and arrive 
at Maasvlakte or Europort in Rotterdam. The second route, contain vessels departing from 
Nigeria and arriving at Maasvlakte or Europort (Rotterdam). The third route is between 
Puerto La Cruz (Venezuela) and Port Freeport (United States, Texas); the vessels depart from 
Venezuela and arrive at Port Freeport. 
 
In Table 1 below includes all the variables used in the result section. The variable 
SulphurEmission represents the total amount of Sulphur in tons released per voyage. The 
assumption we have made when calculating the Sulphur emission variable is that the vessels 
operate on the regulation classed fuel. This means that all vessels operate on 3.5% fuel outside 
of ECA and operate on 1.0% fuel inside ECA before 2015-01-01 and 0.1% fuel after 2015-01-
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01. This assumption will probably cause an overestimation on the amount of Sulphur emitted 
since the Sulphur content in the fuel can vary between 2.3% and 3.5% outside of ECA. 
However this assumption is necessary due to us being unable to receive data on the Sulphur 
content in the fuel consumed. The NewRegulation variable is a dummy variable that will take 
the numeric value of 1 if the vessel departs after 2015-01-01. This will in turn indicate that the 
vessel is operating under the new regulation, if not the value is 0. The Low Sulphur fuel used 
in the regression is Marine Gas Oil (MGO) and the variable FuelPriceMGO is MGO price in 
dollars per ton.  The Sulphur ratio pre 2015-01-01 is 1.0% per mass (ton) and the cap post is 
0.1%. The fuel prices used for the calculations are the corresponding prices of the date of 
departure. The LowPriceMGO is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the price of MGO is 
lower than 489 dollar/ton, otherwise 0. The variable HighPriceMGO is also a dummy and is 
equal 1 if the price of MGO is above 880 dollars per ton, otherwise 0. The price reference 
category is IntermediatePriceMGO which is equal to 1 if the price of MGO is between 489 
and 880 dollars per ton, otherwise 0. We chose the cutoff point for LowPriceMGO at 489 
dollars because it is corresponded with the average fuel price of MGO after 2015-01-01, 
around the same time as the fuel crash. The same reasoning was behind the HighPriceMGO 
cutoff point which was the average fuel price before 2015-01-01. The variable 
DepartureYearDay represents the year and day that the vessel departs from port. The variable 
is defined as follows; the amount of days that have passed since the start of the year, e.g. the 
date 2014-11-27 is written as 2014331. 
 
The seasonal dummies are part of the regression to control for seasonal factors such as 
weather, which can have an effect on the amount of fuel used. The definition of the winter 
season is from December until February, spring is March to May, summer season is from June 
to August and fall from September to November. The Summer variable is the base line 
variable.  
 
Voyage draft is how deep the hull sits under the water, measured in meters (m) during the 
voyage. Design draft represents the maximum hull depth under the water that the vessel is 
designed to descend. The variable FillingFactor shows how big the volume of cargo is during 
a voyage in comparison to the maximum cargo capacity presented in percent. The 
FillingFactor is calculated by dividing VoyageDraft with DesignDraft. DistanceTotal is the 
variable for total distance travelled by a vessel. Voyage distance is measured in nautical miles 
(nm). The variable ShareofDistanceECA has been calculated for the purpose of knowing the 
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percentage of total distance travelled inside an ECA. ShareofDistanceECA was calculated by 
dividing the distance travelled inside ECA by the total distance travelled. The Speed variable 
shows the average speed a vessel travels at during its voyage in knots. These variables are part 
of a standard OLS-regression as well as several analytical analyses made, for the purpose to 
look at which factors affects the emission of total Sulphur released. 
 
Table 1: Variable List 
 
Variable Explanation Mean  St.Dev.  
Variables used in Regression’s    
SulphurEmission = The total amount Sulphur released on the voyage (tons) 5.786 7.239 
NewRegulation =1 if the vessel departure after 2015-01-01, indicating if the vessel 
followed the new regulation or old regulation. 
  
Nigeria =1 if the route the vessel is traveling on is the Nigerian route   
Venezuela =1 if the route the vessel is traveling on is the Venezuelan route   
Russia =1 if the route the vessel is traveling on is the Russian route   
LowPriceMGO =1 if the price of the MGO fuel is lower than 489 dollars/ton   
IntermediatePriceMGO =1 if the price of the MGO fuel is between 489 and 880 
dollars/ton 
  
HighPriceMGO =1 if the price of the MGO fuel is higher than  880 dollar/ton   
DepartureYearDay = The year and day that the vessel departed from port.    
Winter =1 if the vessel departed between December and February   
Spring =1 if the vessel departed between March and May    
Fall =1 if the vessel departed between September and November   
Summer =1 if the vessel departed between June and August   
FillingFactor = The voyage draft divided by design draft. A value showing how 
much the volume of cargo in comparison to the maximum volume 
of cargo the vessel can carry. Measured in % 
0.911 0.0682 
DistanceTotal = The total distance travelled by the vessel (nm)  2061.589 1054.730 
ShareDistanceECA = The total amount of distance travelled inside ECA divided by 
the total distance of the voyage  
0.658 0.417 
Speed = The average speed travelled during the voyage (knots) 11.905 0.830 
Variables used in Calculations    
VoyageDraft  = How deep the hull sits under water (m) 13.821 1.378 
DesignDraft = Maximum hull depth the vessel is designed to descend under 
water. 
15.202 0.839 
Suezmax =1 if the vessels deadweight is between 120-200,000 tons    
Aframax =1 if the vessels deadweight is between 80-120,000 tons   
FuelUsedHFO = Total amount of HFO fuel used during a voyage. 
(Mean and St.Dev. when Russia is excluded) 
144.367 
(347.717) 
213.07 
(196.501) 
FuelUsedMGO = Total amount of MGO fuel used during a voyage. 126.258 68.308 
FuelPriceHFO = The price of High Sulphur fuel (HFO) in dollars ($) per ton. 395.920 160.804 
FuelPriceMGO = The price of Low Sulphur fuel (MGO) in dollars ($) per ton.  666.993 215.332 
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4.2 Total amount of Sulphur Released  
As can be seen in Table 2 below the average amount of Sulphur released before the new 
regulation was 4.930 tons per voyage and after the regulation the average amount increased to 
5.130 tons outside of ECA. A possible explanation for this can be that vessels modify the 
routes to avoid ECA’s due to the increased costs of operating inside these areas. There is 
evidence of this in Table 3 were we can see that the share of distance for the Venezuelan route 
has decreased in ECA. We will be looking further into this later in section 5.4.  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of total amount of Sulphur released 
 All Route  Venezuela  Nigeria  Russia 
Average Sulphur released outside ECA pre 2015-01-01 
(tons) 4.930 6.764 20.715 0 
Average Sulphur released outside ECA post 2015-01-01 
(tons) 5.130 8.058 21.108 0 
     
Average Sulphur released inside ECA pre 2015-01-01 
(tons) 1.26105 0.616 0.684 1.744 
Average Sulphur released inside ECA post 2015-01-01 
(tons) 0.1264 0.0380 0.070 0.176 
Values calculated with the help of Equation 4 in appendix. 
Also shown in Table 2 is the amount of Sulphur released inside ECA pre and post the new 
regulation. It is clear that the amount of Sulphur has drastically decreased per route after the 
enforcement of the new regulation inside of ECA. This result is not surprising since the 
Sulphur cap was reduced from 1% to 0.1%. Table 3 shows the share of distance that the 
vessels operate inside of an ECA for each specific route.  
Table 3: Share of Distance Analysis 
	
 Venezuela  Nigeria  Russia 
Average share of distance in ECA pre 2015-01-01 0.263 0.102 1 
		       
Average share of distance in ECA post 2015-01-01 0.164 0.105 1 
Values calculated with the help of Equation 7 in appendix 
 
 
Since the introduction of ECAs has been such an expensive regulation for the industry. Non-
compliance from vessels will affect the level playing field and in turn the vessels operating 
within an ECA. Calculations for non-compliance of 10%, 25%, 50% and 100% were made. 
The effect from non-compliance would be negative for the environment, but economically 
beneficial for the vessel operators. Non-compliance could lead to an imbalanced market 
competition were both emissions and profits would increase. The method of calculation for 
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non-compliance can be found in appendix, Equation 1. Equation 2 is the equation for the 
additional amount of emission emitted for x% non-compliance and Equation 3 calculates the 
profit gained per x% non-compliance, these equations are found in the appendix. The profit 
gained from non-compliance can be used to reduce the price of cargo shipped per ton, in turn 
affecting the level playing field. The equation used is also found in appendix, Equation 4. 
These calculations will be used in the analytical part of the results. 
In Diagram 3 we depict what is meant by non-compliance at different % levels. Instead of the 
vessel switching to MGO at the ECA border the vessels keeps using HFO for 10%, 25%, 
50%, 100% additional distance into the ECA. 
 
Diagram 3: Non-compliance illustration 
 
 
5. Results 
The results section is split into six different parts. The first three parts will be using a standard 
OLS-regression. The first part will be taking every route into account and looking at what 
variables affect the Sulphur emissions. Then we will separately be looking at the effect that 
oil-prices have on Sulphur emissions. The third and fourth part will be analyzing the routes: 
Russia, Nigeria and Venezuela separately aiming to find where the new ECA regulation has 
had the most impact, if any at all. The efficiency standard EEOI will be calculated in the fifth 
part then moving onto a hypothetical vessel non-compliance analysis in the final part. 
Some remarks should be made before continuing on to the regressions part of the paper. All 
regressions have been tested for multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity. The measuring 
system used for collecting the data is not flawless hence resulting in the removal of 10 vessels 
that where either missing data or contained unreasonable outliers. 
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The initial thought was to include both the regulation variable NewRegulation and 
FuelPriceMGO to see which had the most effect. This was however not possible due to high 
correlations between the two (0.88).  We will instead be analyzing the oil price in two 
different regressions, one before the oil crash 2014-11-27 and one after. The reasoning behind 
splitting the oil-price regression in two parts is to control for the high correlation between 
NewRegulation and FuelPriceMGO that was cause by the massive plummet in the oil prices. 
This can be seen in Graph 1 in results. Had we not split the regression then we would be 
unable to see the effect of the oil prices.  
5.1 The Combined Route Analysis 
The regressions in Table 4 below were run to analyze which factors that have an effect on the 
release of Sulphur in all the three routes. We looked specifically for the effect of the new 
ECA regulation as well as the price of the low Sulphur fuel. Both regressions are being 
controlled for seasons. Seasonal effects refer to factors such as high seas, wind and other 
weather factors. We set the season summer as our reference category in the model. The 
reasoning for this is that the weather tends to be less volatile during the summer in 
comparison to the other seasons, leading to a more constant fuel usage. FillingFactor will be 
controlling for the cargo the vessel is carrying and DistanceTotal for the total distance of the 
voyage. 
Regression 1:  SulphurEmission = B0 + B1FuelPriceMGO + B2Winter + B3 Spring + B4 Fall + B5Speed + B6 FillingFactor+ 
B7 DistanceTotal + E    DepartureYearDay<2014331 
Regression 2:  SulphurEmission = B0 + B1FuelPriceMGO + B2Winter + B3 Spring + B4 Fall + B5Speed + B6 FillingFactor+ 
B7 DistanceTotal + E    DepartureYearDay>2014331 
Regression 3:  SulphurEmission = B0 + B1NewRegulation + B2Winter + B3 Spring + B4 Fall + B5Speed + B6 FillingFactor+ 
B7 DistanceTotal + E 
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Table 4: Regressions 1, 2 and 3 
 
 Fuel Prices pre-crash Fuel Prices post-crash New Regulation 
  SulphurEmission SulphurEmission SulphurEmission 
  
 
 FuelPriceMGO -0.0008 0.001 - 
 
(0.002) (0.001) 
 
  
 
 NewRegulation - - -1.074*** 
  
 (0.232) 
  
 
 Winter 1.364*** 0.057 0.375* 
 
(0.364) (0.293) (0.337) 
  
 
 Spring 0.310 -0.211 0.57 
 
(0.217) (0.324) (0.186) 
  
 
 Fall 0.348 -0.276 -0.014 
 
(0.317) (0.294) (0.327) 
  
 
 Speed 0.581*** 1.167*** 0.947*** 
 
(0.129) (0.112) (0.140) 
  
 
 FillingFactor 0.086 -2.578* -1.442 
 
(1.713) (1.491) (1.694) 
  
 
 DistanceTotal 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.266) 
   
Intercept  -13.307*** -20.286 -17.066*** 
 (3.279) (1.003) (1.378) 
N  284 334 619 
R-squared (robust) 0.949 0.955 0.948 
Adj R-squared 0.945 0.954 0.948 
*** = significant at 1% level, **= significant at 5% level, and *= significant at 10% level.	
The FuelPriceMGO coefficient in regression 1 and 2 is insignificant both before and after the 
crash in oil prices. This means that according to this analysis the price of MGO fuel has no 
significant effect on the amount of Sulphur released. However this is highly unlikely and we 
will therefore be creating another analysis in part 5.2 to test if high respective low price levels 
have an effect on Sulphur emissions. 
The variable NewRegulation in the third regression is significant on a 1% level and just as 
expected has a negative coefficient. The coefficient of -1.074 tells us that after the new 
regulation was enforced the release of SO2 has reduced with approximately 1.1 ton per 
voyage.  This is not surprising since the new regulation forces vessels to use fuel that releases 
less Sulphur than previous years.   
The dummies indicating the different seasons in regression 1, 2 and 3 are mostly insignificant 
except winter which is significant on a 1% level in regression 1 and a 10% level in regression 
3. We expected to see only a minor effect from weather. Not surprisingly the winter season 
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had a significant effect due to the fact that the weather during this season is generally much 
more unforgiving leading to more volatile seas and in turn forcing the vessels to use more 
fuel.  The coefficient for winter in regression 1 is 1.364 and in regression 3, 0.375. This 
means that during the winter season, the vessels use 1.364 respectively 0.375 tons of fuel 
more per voyage in comparison to the summer season. It should be noted that the difference 
between the two coefficients is due to the data set being split. In regression 1 we only look at 
vessels operating before the oil price crash 2014-11-27, during this time the vessels were 
operating on 1% Sulphur fuel inside ECA and instead of the 0.1% fuel used today which can 
in turn explain the big difference in the coefficients.  
The variable Speed is significant on a 1% level in regressions 1, 2 and 3 as expected it has a 
positive coefficient. If we take the coefficient, 0.947, for speed from regression 3 and use this 
we can see that if the vessels where to increase their speed by 1 knot in average for the entire 
voyage, then the amount of Sulphur released would increase by 0.947 tons. The size 
difference between the coefficients from regressions 1 and 2 is due to the difference in the 
vessels route. In our data there are less vessels traveling the Russian route after 27/11/2014 
which means that in regression 2 there are more vessels that operate on HFO during a bigger 
part of their journey than in regression 1. This would then in turn increase the amount of 
Sulphur released per voyage due to the skewed observations. 
FillingFactor is slightly significant on a 10% level with a negative coefficient of -2.578. This 
means that as the vessels cargo gets closer to its max capacity the amount of Sulphur per 
voyage will decrease. For every 1% increase in intake the total amount of Sulphur per voyage 
will decrease with 0.02578 tons. This result is not realistic and therefore not applicable to the 
real world. A vessel carrying more cargo cannot consume less fuel during their voyage. We 
included the variable because it represents the weight of the vessel without correlating with 
the other variables. We are aware that this part of our regression is a weakness.  
The DistanceTotal variable is significant on a 1% level for all three regressions. It also has a 
positive coefficient of approximately 0.007 which is what we expect to see. This means that 
for every extra nautical mile (1.852 km) that the vessel travels will result in an additional 
0.007 tons of Sulphur being released.  
The Adjusted R-squared for all three regressions are high. They are all approximately 0.95 
meaning that the model has a high coefficient of determination and explains 95% of the 
variance. 
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5.2 Oil Price Analysis 
This part will be taking a closer look at the effect of the price of MGO on the amount of 
Sulphur released. Before the meeting in Vienna 2014-11-27 the price of MGO was 880.54 
dollars/ton and the high Sulphur HFO price was 559.76 dollars/ton. After the drop until the 
start of 2016 the average prices were 488.87 respectively 259.30 dollars/ton. These values are 
calculated with the data provided by MBAB. This can also be seen in Graph 1. The oil prices 
used in the paper are the once from Rotterdam and Houston, Texas which is where the vessels 
tend to refuel. The average price of MGO before and after the crash will be used as a baseline 
for the Low Price and High Price. That means that if the price of oil is higher than 880 then 
the price will be classified as high and if it is below 488 then it will be classified as low. The 
reference category is IntermediatePrice which is when the price is between 488 and 880 
dollars per ton.  
Graph 1: Oil Prices  
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Regression 4:  SulphurEmission =B0 + B1LowPriceMGO + B2HighPriceMGO + B3 Winter + B4Spring +B5Fall+ B6Speed + 
B7 FillingFactor+ B8 DistanceTotal + E 
Table 5: Regression 4 
 
Price Analysis 
 Sulphur Emission 
  LowPriceMGO -0.923*** 
 
(0.164) 
HighPriceMGO 0.601*** 
 (0.193) 
  Winter 0.265 
 
(0.203) 
  Spring -0.301 
 
(0.187) 
  Fall 0.243 
 
(0.189) 
  Speed 0.910*** 
 
(0.087) 
  FillingFactor -0.345 
 
(1.082) 
  DistanceTotal 0.007*** 
 
(0.000) 
   
Intercept -17.996***    
 (1.392) 
N 619 
R-squared 0.947 
 Adju R-squared 0.947 
*** = significant at 1% level, **= significant at 5% level, and *= significant at 10% level. 
	
The variable LowPriceMGO and HighPriceMGO in regression 4 are both highly significant. 
The coefficient for LowPriceMGO is -0.923 which means that if the price of MGO is lower 
than 488 dollars/ton then the vessels will release 0.923 tons less Sulphur during their voyage. 
One explanation behind this effect can be that vessels are less inclined to skirt the regulation, 
using the MGO fuel, since the financial gains are not as great when prices are low. The 
variable HighPriceMGO has a coefficient of 0.601 which means that if the price of MGO is 
greater than 880 dollars/ton then the amount of Sulphur released will increase by 0.601 tons. 
The reasoning behind this is the high price of the MGO fuel. The higher the price the more 
inclined vessel operators are to skirt the regulation to increase profits and this leading to 
increased amount of Sulphur released 
23	
	
The variables Speed and DistanceTotal are both highly significant and show a very similar 
result to what we saw in regression 3. The adjusted R-squared is very high at approximately 
95%.  
5.3 Route Analysis with Total Distance 
Regression 5:  SulphurEmission (Nigeria) =B0 + B1NewRegulation + B2Winter + B3 Spring + B4 Fall + B5Speed + B6 
FillingFactor+ B7 DistanceTotal + E,  Nigeria=1 
Regression 6:  SulphurEmission (Venezuela) =B0 + B1 NewRegulation + B2Winter + B3 Spring + B4 Fall + B5Speed + B6 
FillingFactor+ B7 DistanceTotal + E,  Venezuela=1 
Regression 7:  SulphurEmission (Russia) =B0 + B1 NewRegulation + B2Winter + B3 Spring + B4 Fall + B5Speed + B6 
FillingFactor+ B7 DistanceTotal + E,  Russia=1 
Table 6: Regressions 5, 6 and 7 
  
Route Analysis (Distance) 
   Nigeria Venezuela Russia 
 
Sulphur Emission Sulphur Emission Sulphur Emission 
NewRegulation -0.123 0.606** -1.840*** 
 
(0.392) (0.266) (0.101) 
    Winter 0.698 0.418 0.481*** 
 
(0.518)  (0.354) (0.175) 
    Spring 0.830 0.253 0.103** 
 
(0.610) (0.413) (0.052) 
    Fall 0.330 0.561 0.131** 
 
(0.449) (0.411) (0.055) 
    Speed 2.065***  0.544*** 0.019 
 
(0.220) (0.134) (0.056) 
    FillingFactor 0.896 -2.203 -0.571 
 
(3.145) (2.088) (0.731) 
    DitanceTotal 0.006*** -0.002 0.0007 
 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.0009) 
        
Intercept -31.436***    7.111    1.187    
 (6.081) (8.970) (1.502) 
N 91 166 362 
R-squared 0.846 0.108 0.590 
Adju R-squared  0.519 0.068  0.582 
*** = significant at 1% level, **= significant at 5% level, and *= significant at 10% level. 
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The variable NewRegulation is significant at a 1% level in regression 7 on the Russia route, a 
5% level in regression 6 on the Venezuela route and not significant in regression 5 on the 
Nigeria route. This can be explained by the amount of time that is spent in the ECA’s. The 
vessels that travel on the Nigerian route spend the majority of the voyage outside of ECA the 
effect of the new regulation will therefore have a minimal effect on their Sulphur released in 
turn providing an insignificant variable. Proof of this can be seen in Table 3 showing how the 
share of distance in ECA for the Nigerian route is only 10%.  
The largest effect of the new ECA regulation was seen in Russia with a coefficient -1.840. 
This means that after the new regulation was put into force the amount of Sulphur released 
per voyage decreased by 1.840 tons. This was expected due to the fact that the vessels only 
travel inside the European ECA. Surprisingly however we found a positive coefficient of the 
new ECA regulation on the Venezuelan route. The coefficient is 0.606 which means that the 
amount of Sulphur emitted per voyage has increased by approximately 0.6 tons after the new 
regulation was put into force. This is why we will be analyzing the share of distance in ECA 
instead of the total distance in the next regression.  We suspect that the vessels that travel 
between Texas and Venezuela have changed their routes to reduce the distance travelled in 
ECA to minimize cost resulting in more Sulphur being released.  
The different season variables are insignificant for the Nigerian and Venezuelan route 
however all the season variables are significant on the Russia route. The variable Winter is 
significant on a 1% level while Fall and Spring are significant on a 5% level. The coefficients 
tell us that vessels traveling during winter will release an additional 0.481 tons, during fall 
0.103 tons and during the spring 0.131 tons of Sulphur when compared to summer. The size 
of these coefficients can be explained by the weather during the season that can make the 
voyage more volatile and result in more fuel being consumed. One possible reason why the 
effect of weather is insignificant on the routes Venezuela and Nigeria can be due to the 
weather being less volatile than in comparison to the North.  
The variable Speed is highly significant in both Nigeria and Venezuela. The size of the 
coefficient is 2.065 for Nigeria and 0.544 for Venezuela. This means that if the average speed 
of the journey would increase by 1 knot on the Nigerian route the amount of Sulphur released 
would increase by 2.065 tons and 0.544 tons respectively for Venezuela. The reason for the 
positive coefficients can be due to the fact that the speed plays a more crucial role on these 
routes because the routes are longer than the Russian route.  The reason for Nigeria’s high 
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Speed coefficient is that the vessels traveling on the Nigerian route are bigger; therefore small 
changes in speed will lead to bigger effects on the amount of Sulphur released. This can also 
explain why the variable DistanceTotal is highly significant for the Nigerian route while it is 
insignificant for the other routes. The effect of one extra nautical mile on larger vessels would 
result in a more significant increase in Sulphur emissions. The Suezmax7 vessels operating on 
the Nigerian route would emit 0.006 tons extra Sulphur per nautical mile. Naturally Aframax 
vessels will also release more Sulphur if the distance travelled increases. 
The Adjusted R-squared values are higher for the Russian and Nigerian route, at 0.5. However 
the Venezuelan has a very low adjusted r-squared of 0.0683 which means that the results from 
this regression have a very low coefficient of determination. 
5.4 Route Analysis with Share of Distance 
As previously mentioned the variable DistanceTotal is unable to capture how much of the 
voyage is spent inside an ECA. Since the new ECA regulation only affects vessels operating 
inside the ECA’s, using a variable to explain how much of the voyage distance is spent in 
ECA’s is appropriate. Regressions 8 and 9 below are similar to the previous regressions but 
instead we control for the share of distance inside ECA instead of the total distance travelled. 
The Russian route has been excluded from this regression since the entire voyage takes place 
inside ECA which means that the variable ShareDistanceECA is 1 and will therefore show no 
effect.  
Regression 8:  SulphurEmission (Nigeria) =B0 + B1NewRegulation + B2Winter + B3 Spring + B4 Fall + B5Speed + B6 
FillingFactor+ B7 ShareDistanceECA + E,  Nigeria=1 
Regression 9:  SulphurEmission (Venezuela) =B0 + B1 NewRegulation + B2Winter + B3 Spring + B4 Fall + B5Speed + B6 
FillingFactor+ B7 ShareDistanceECA + E,  Venezuela=1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
7 We were unable to use Suezmax in the regression due to the fact that in our data set this vessel type only travels 
on the Nigerian route. Therefore there is a high correlation between the Nigerian route and the vessel type. 
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Table 7: Regressions 8 and 9 
 
Route Analysis controlling for Share of Distance 
 
  
Nigeria 
Sulphur Emission 
Venezuela 
Sulphur Emission 
   NewRegulation -0.264 -0.100 
 
(0.419) (0.207) 
   Winter 1.585***  0.177 
 
(0.557) (0.276) 
   Spring 1.585*  0.238 
 
(0.636) (0.271) 
   Fall 1.299** 0.160 
 
(0.564) (0.313) 
   Speed 2.234*** 0.583*** 
 
(0.233) (0.101) 
   FillingFactor 1.432 -3.575** 
 
(3.255) (1.467) 
   ShareDistanceECA -23.214*** -6.969*** 
 
(6.538) (0.356) 
     
Intercept -5.448    5.093***    
 (4.385) (1.754) 
N 91 166 
R-squared 0.504 0.497 
 Adju R-squared 0.463 0.475 
*** = significant at 1% level, **= significant at 5% level, and *= significant at 10% level. 
The effect of the new ECA regulation is still insignificant on the Nigerian route, and is now 
also insignificant for the Venezuelan route. This means that we have an insignificant effect of 
the ECA regulation on two of our three routes. This is because the vessels that travel on the 
Nigerian and Venezuelan spend the majority of their voyage outside of ECA and therefore not 
significantly affected by the regulation inside ECA.  
This time the Nigerian route has positive significant seasonal effects. This can be explained 
because the model takes into account the time spent in ECA. Since the Nigerian route travels 
through the European ECA the vessels are exposed to the harsher Northern climate. If the 
Nigerian vessels travel during the winter the increased amount of Sulphur will be 1.585 tons, 
during the fall 1.299 tons and 1.585 tons during the spring per voyage respectively. These 
values however are not the best predictors due to the small sample 91 observations that we 
had on the Nigerian route.  
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The Speed variable is very similar for these regressions when compared to the previous 
regressions. It is highly significant for the routes Nigeria and Venezuela. The coefficients 
have increased minutely for the Nigerian and Venezuelan route but nothing that is 
noteworthy. 
The FillingFactor variable has also become significant on a 5% level for the route Venezuela. 
The coefficient for the variable is -3.575. This means that as the vessels cargo gets closer to 
its max capacity the amount of Sulphur per voyage will decrease. For every 1% increase in 
intake the total amount of Sulphur per voyage will decrease with approximately 0.036 tons. 
This result was not what we had expected. Our expectation was that as the cargo in the vessel 
increases, in turn increasing the filling factor, resulting in more fuel being consumed and 
more Sulphur emitted. This means that we expected a positive coefficient for the filling 
factor. We suspect that the variable becomes significant only because the share of distance is 
a better indicator for the amount of Sulphur being released on the Venezuelan route. This is 
most likely a measurement error and not possible because the coefficient of the variable 
FillingFactor cannot be negative in the real-world. If this result were to be true, we would be 
stating that the more cargo a vessel is carrying the less fuel is consumed. 
The variable of most interest is the variable ShareDistanceECA which is highly significant for 
both the Nigeria and the Venezuelan route.  The coefficient for the Nigerian route is -23.214 
and for the Venezuelan -6.969. This means that if the vessels were to increase their distance in 
ECA by 1% this would then decrease the Sulphur released with 0.232 tons on the Nigerian 
route and 0.070 tons on the Venezuelan route per voyage. This helps to support our statement 
that vessels operating on the Venezuelan route have modified their route to avoid the new 
ECA regulation; this will be further proven in the next part 5.5. One possible reason for the 
difference in the two coefficients can be explained by the Suezmax vessels operating on the 
Nigerian route. Compared to the Aframax vessels operating on the Venezuelan route the 
Suezmax vessels are larger and consume more fuel per distance travelled hence emitting more 
Sulphur.  
5.5 Energy Efficiency Analysis 
The Energy Efficiency Operational Indicator (EEOI) is a way to test if the new regulation had 
the effect it was intended to have by looking if vessels have become more efficient. If vessels 
have become more efficient with their fuel consumption there will be a diminished impact on 
individual’s health and the environment due to reduced Sulphur emissions. The EEOI 
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equation can be used to analyze the result of the regulation (IMO 5, 2009). This equation 
calculates the ratio of mass to Sulphur dioxide emitted per unit of transport work. Given that 
the regulations entry into force was on the first of January 2015, average values of EEOI have 
been calculated pre and post this date on each route. If vessels have optimized there 
operational efficiency then we should get a lower numeric value of EEOI post 2015-01-01. 
This means that the regulation has had an effect. The calculations does not taking into account 
vessels skirting the regulation by not switching to MGO entering an ECA.  
 
 !!"# = %&' ∗ )"2+'',-./01 ∗ 2  
• j is the fuel type 
• FCj is the mass of consumed fuel, j 
• SO2j is the percentage of SO2 released per ton of fuel, j 
• Mcargo mass of the cargo that the vessel is shipping (tons) 
• D is the Distance of the voyage, nautical miles (nm).  
 
The EEOI analysis will be focusing on if vessels have become more efficient after the new 
ECA regulation. An EEOI analysis will be conducted for each route, pre and post the 
regulation to see the change in efficiency. We have also generated an additional calculation 
showing the effect of the future global cap that will be introduced outside of ECA’s. As 
previously mentioned the Sulphur cap will be adjusted from 3.5% to 0.5%.  
Table 8: EEOI calculations 
 
 Russian Route Nigerian Route Venezuelan Route 
Average EEOI pre 2015-01-01 1.133E-08 3.584E-08 3.797E-08 
Average EEOI post 2015-01-01 1.151E-09 3.466E-08 4.219E-08 
Average Future EEOI (0.5% Global)  5.060E-09 5.716E-09 
 
In Russia we have an EEOI value post regulation of 1.151E-09 which is lower than the pre 
EEOI value of 1.133E-08. This is consistent with the results from our regressions and what is 
expected from a route only taking place inside an ECA. This helps support that the new ECA 
regulation has made vessels operating on the Russian route more efficient.   
The Nigerian route only has a very small and insignificant decrease in EEOI after the 
regulation came into effect. This is also consistent with what is seen in the regressions. A 
reason behind this can be that the route Nigeria has a very small percentage of its voyage 
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inside of ECA. However it can also be due to less efficient usage of fuel or less efficient usage 
of cargo space, meaning they do not fill the vessel to its optimum capacity. The reason behind 
this type of effect is most likely due to the drastic decrease in oil prices. Also note that the 
future EEOI value is much lower, when the global cap changes meaning the efficiency will 
increase.  
The results from the EEOI analysis on the Venezuelan route are completely different. The 
EEOI has actually increased. This is consistent with what the regressions have shown. The 
values in Table 3 show proof of this. Instead of the vessels increasing their efficiency they 
have instead decided to avoid the new regulation. We suspect that the vessels modify their 
voyage on this route to reduce the time spent inside ECA which in turn would affect the EEOI 
values. Another explanation can be either the drop in oil-prices has made vessels traveling on 
the Venezuelan route less cautious about the consumption of fuel by prioritizing delivery 
speed. 
 
5.6 Non-Compliance Cost Analysis 
If vessels decide not to adhere to the regulation they can gain massive financial profits. A 
tanker of 100,000 dwt from the Atlantic entering an ECA for the purpose to bunker at 
Primorsk in Russia and later return can save USD 50-70,000 on just one voyage (Marine 
Benchmark and Brodin, 2016). These profits are high enough to suspect that there is financial 
motive for skirting the regulations. 
In Tables 9 thru 11 below are hypothetical situations generated from our data where the 
vessels, traveling on a specific route, decide not to adhere to the regulation and instead skirt it 
by using HFO fuel instead of MGO fuel inside ECA. This would then show the estimated 
profits of non-compliance and the additional amount of Sulphur emitted. These are average 
values that are split between two different time intervals, for pre 2015-01-01 and post 2015-
01-01. Some of the hypothetical situations are extreme however vessels have had the 
possibility to skirt due to lack of monitoring and enforcement methods. 
We looked at four different levels of non-compliance that was covered previously in the data 
section, 10%, 25%, 50% and 100%. The tables show how much the cost of the trip would 
have been if they ignored the regulation, the increased amount of Sulphur released when not 
complying with the regulation, the amount of money the company earns by not complying 
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and how much cheaper their cost is per ton cargo shipped. This is all in comparison to the 
original voyage where we assume that the vessels fully comply with the regulation. These cost 
and emission calculations assume that everything else is constant. 
The pre regulation calculations show a clear picture of the financial gains from skirting the 
regulation where some vessels can earn up to several thousand dollars. It also shows how 
much greater the impact is from non-compliance vessels on the environment since the vessels 
release tons of additional Sulphur. Note that the effects are much bigger for the Russian route 
due to the fact that their entire voyage takes place inside of the Baltic and Nordic Sea ECA, 
making the effect of skirting the regulation more severe.  
The interpretation of the post regulation gains becomes a bit more difficult. The expectation is 
that the cost of the new fuel will be higher due to the lower Sulphur content. This should in 
turn increase the financial gains from skirting the regulation considerably. However since the 
oil prices plummeted around the same time as the regulation came into force the financial 
gains have not increased but instead decreased. These results are consistent for all three routes 
and can be seen in Tables 9-11. It should be mentioned that the reason for the increase in 
Sulphur released in tons is so much higher pre the regulation in comparison to post the 
regulation is due to the big Sulphur level difference in the fuel. The Sulphur level difference 
between outside and inside ECA increased from 3.5% to 1.0% pre the new regulation 
compared to 3.5% to 0.1% post the new regulation. Due to our assumption that all vessels use 
classed regulation fuel the increase in Sulphur emitted will probably be overestimated. 
However since the vessels fuel outside of ECA can vary from 3.5% and 2.3% we have 
decided to compute a non-compliance scenario with a low Sulphur level as well.  
As the prices decrease so does the financial gain from skirting the regulation, the companies 
will then more likely decide to follow the regulation leading to reduced emissions and 
diminished environmental and health impacts. However it should be noted that the oil prices 
have started to rise and the financial gains from skirting the regulation will now start to 
increase. This might in turn lead to more vessels deciding to skirt the regulation resulting in 
increased emissions and negative effects on the environment and individual’s health.  
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9867.327 dollars is on average how much a vessel would profit from 25% non-compliance 
traveling between Primorsk and Rotterdam. This is only from one voyage; it is obvious to see 
that a vessel operator could save a fortune from doing this every time. There is also an 
increased amount of Sulphur emitted when vessels decide to non-comply with 25%. They 
emit an additional 1.48 tons of Sulphur within the ECA which will in turn effect the 
environment and individual’s health. Had the vessels used the lower Sulphur fuel of 2.3% 
then the vessels would instead release 0.968 tons of Sulphur. So the increased amount of 
Sulphur from this non-compliance would be anywhere in between 1.48 tons and 0.968 tons.
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Non-Compliance Cost Analysis (Route Russia) 
	
Table 9: Cost Analysis for Route Russia
averages pre  
2015-01-01    3.5%  HFO fuel  2.3%  HFO fuel       
averages post 
2015-01-01 3,5% HFO fuel   2,3% HFO fuel      
Original Cost of Trip ($) 
Total Sulphur 
Released (tons)  
Total Sulphur 
Released (tons)      Cost of Trip ($) 
Total Sulphur 
Released (tons)  
Total Sulphur 
Released (tons)     
  149187.525 1.744 1.744      83649.889 0.176 0.176     
Non-compliance 
10% Cost of Trip ($) 
Increased Sulphur 
released (tons) 
Increased Sulphur 
released (tons) Earned  
Cheaper ($)/ 
ton  Cost of Trip ($) 
Increased Sulphur 
released (tons) 
Increased 
Sulphur released 
(tons) Earned  
Cheaper ($)/ 
ton 
  143738.008 0.436 0.227 5449.518 0.051  79693.958 0.599 0.387 3946.931 0.037 
Non-compliance 
25% Cost of Trip ($) 
Increased Sulphur 
released (tons) 
Increased Sulphur 
released (tons) Earned  
Cheaper ($)/ 
ton  Cost of Trip ($) 
Increased Sulphur 
released (tons) 
Increased 
Sulphur released 
(tons) Earned  
Cheaper ($)/ 
ton 
  135563.732 1.090 0.567 13623.794 0.127  73773.562 1.480 0.968 9867.327 0.092 
Non-compliance 
50% Cost of Trip ($) 
Increased Sulphur 
released (tons) 
Increased Sulphur 
released (tons) Earned  
Cheaper ($)/ 
ton  Cost of Trip ($) 
Increased Sulphur 
released (tons) 
Increased 
Sulphur released 
(tons) Earned  
Cheaper ($)/ 
ton 
  121939.938 2.18 1.134 27247.587 0.254  63906.235 2.994 1.936 19734.654 0.184 
Non-compliance 
100% 
Cost of Trips 
($) 
Increased Sulphur 
released (tons) 
Increased Sulphur 
released (tons) Earned  
Cheaper ($)/ 
ton  Cost of Trip ($) 
Increased Sulphur 
released (tons) 
Increased 
Sulphur released 
(tons) Earned  
Cheaper ($)/ 
ton 
  94692.351 4.360 2.267 54495.175 0.508  44171.581 5.990 3.871 39469.308 0.368 
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Non-compliance Cost Analysis (Route Nigeria) 
 
 Table 10: Cost Analysis for Route Nigeria
averages pre 
2015-01-01    3.5%  HFO fuel  2.3%  HFO fuel       
averages post 
2015-01-01  3.5%  HFO fuel  2.3%  HFO fuel      
Original Cost of Trip ($) 
Total Sulphur 
Released (tons)  
Total Sulphur 
Released (tons)      Cost of Trip ($) 
Total Sulphur 
Released (tons)  
Total Sulphur 
Released (tons)     
  387673.099 21.399 14.300      201146.719 21.179 13.942     
Non-compliance 
10% Cost of Trip ($) 
Increased Sulphur 
released (tons) 
Increased Sulphur 
released (tons) Earned  
Cheaper 
($)/ ton  Cost of Trip ($) 
Increased Sulphur 
released (tons) 
Increased 
Sulphur released 
(tons) Earned  
Cheaper ($)/ 
ton 
  385523.734 0.168 0.087 2149.365 0.016  199528.425 0.238 0.154 1618.294 0.012 
Non-compliance 
25% Cost of Trip ($) 
Increased Sulphur 
released (tons) 
Increased Sulphur 
released (tons) Earned  
Cheaper 
($)/ ton  Cost of Trip ($) 
Increased Sulphur 
released (tons) 
Increased 
Sulphur released 
(tons) Earned  
Cheaper ($)/ 
ton 
  382299.686 0.421 0.218 5373.412 0.040  197100.984 0.595 0.385 4045.735 0.030 
Non-compliance 
50% Cost of Trip ($) 
Increased Sulphur 
released (tons) 
Increased Sulphur 
released (tons) Earned  
Cheaper 
($)/ ton  Cost of Trip ($) 
Increased Sulphur 
released (tons) 
Increased 
Sulphur released 
(tons) Earned  
Cheaper ($)/ 
ton 
  376926.274 0.842 0.436 10746.825 0.081  193055.248 1.191 0.770 8091.471 0.060 
Non-compliance 
100% Cost of Trip ($) 
Increased Sulphur 
released (tons) 
Increased Sulphur 
released (tons) Earned  
Cheaper 
($)/ ton  Cost of Trip ($) 
Increased Sulphur 
released (tons) 
Increased 
Sulphur released 
(tons) Earned  
Cheaper ($)/ 
ton 
  366179.449 1.685 0.872 21493.650 0.161  184963.777 2.381 1.540 
16182.94
2 0.119 
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Non-compliance Cost Analysis (Route Venezuela) 
 
 
 Table 11: Cost Analysis for Route Venezuela 
 
averages pre 
2015-01-01    3,5% HFO fuel  2,3% HFO fuel  
 
   
averages post 
2015-01-01  3,5% HFO fuel 2,3% HFO fuel     
Original Cost of Trip ($) 
Total Sulphur 
Released (tons) 
Total Sulphur 
Released (tons) 
 
   Cost of Trip ($) 
Total Sulphur Released 
(tons) 
Total Sulphur 
Released (tons)     
  157888.278 7.379 
 
5.060      79332.678 8.096 5.333     
Non-compliance 
10% Cost of Trip ($) 
Increased Sulphur 
released (tons) 
Increased 
Sulphur released 
(tons) Earned  
Cheaper 
($)/ ton  Cost of Trip ($) 
Increased Sulphur 
released (tons) 
Increased 
Sulphur released 
(tons Earned  
Cheaper 
($)/ ton 
  156090.228 0.175 0.094 1798.050 0.019  78643.881 0.154 0.100 688.797 0.008 
Non-compliance 
25% Cost of Trip ($) 
Increased Sulphur 
released (tons) 
Increased 
Sulphur released 
(tons) Earned  
Cheaper 
($)/ ton  Cost of Trip ($) 
Increased Sulphur 
released (tons) 
Increased 
Sulphur released 
(tons Earned  
Cheaper 
($)/ ton 
  153393.154 0.437 0.234 4495.124 0.049  77610.685 0.384 0.250 1721.993 0.019 
Non-compliance 
50% Cost of Trip ($) 
Increased Sulphur 
released (tons) 
Increased 
Sulphur released 
(tons) Earned  
Cheaper 
($)/ ton  Cost of Trip ($) 
Increased Sulphur 
released (tons) 
Increased 
Sulphur released 
(tons Earned  
Cheaper 
($)/ ton 
  148898.030 0.873 0.468 8990.248 0.097  75888.692 0.769 0.500 3443.986 0.038 
Non-compliance 
100% Cost of Trip ($) 
Increased Sulphur 
released (tons) 
Increased 
Sulphur released 
(tons) Earned  
Cheaper 
($)/ ton  Cost of Trip ($) 
Increased Sulphur 
released (tons) 
Increased 
Sulphur released 
(tons Earned  
Cheaper 
($)/ ton 
  139907.782 1.746 0.940 17980.496 0.194  72444.706 1.537 1.000 6887.972 0.076 
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6. Conclusion 
This paper aimed to examine the effect of the new ECA regulation, the effect of MGO fuel 
price on emissions, specific route analysis, changes in vessel efficiency and the effects of non-
compliance. We found that the Sulphur released in total from shipping has reduced 
significantly after the new regulation was put into force which is what we expected to see.  
There was also an insignificant effect of the fuel price on Sulphur released at first. When we 
created a dummy variable indicating high respective low MGO fuel prices we saw significant 
effects. The time of the crash has been problematic for us, since it occurred almost at the same 
date as the new regulation was introduced. Therefore we are unable to test them both in the 
same analysis which also means we are unable to attribute the magnitude of the effect and 
how the two interact. We also found that when controlling for one of the three routes and the 
distance travelled on that route the effect of the new regulation was significant on the Russian 
and Venezuelan route, however the Venezuelan results with its positive coefficient for the 
new regulation was unexpected.  
Due to this we created an analysis where we controlled for the share of distance in ECA and 
we saw that neither the Nigerian route nor the Venezuelan route had a significant effect from 
the new regulation on the amount of Sulphur released. It seems that the new regulation has 
only significantly affected the Russian route and that the amount of distance operating inside 
ECA is more significant for the Sulphur emissions on the Venezuelan and the Nigerian route 
than the new regulation. The efficiency of the vessels improved for the Nigerian and Russian 
route however not for the Venezuelan route. This was not surprising after seeing the share of 
distance analysis results on how Venezuela vessels have modified their route. We cannot say 
that this is due to vessels avoiding the new regulation but it is the most credible explanation.   
The cost analysis of the three routes shows a clear picture that when vessels decide not to 
comply their gains can be massive. Vessels skirting the regulation results in more emissions 
emitted leading to degradation of the environment, health impacts and allowing vessels to 
establish a competitive advantage on the market. However it should be noted that the amount 
of Sulphur emitted is a rough estimation and not necessarily the effects in actuality. That is 
why monitoring and enforcement is crucial to make sure that vessels do not skirt the 
regulation.  A new method is at the moment being developed by Marine Benchmark with the 
assistance of Maersk, WWF, Swedish Maritime Technology Forum and Netherlands Shipping 
Inspectorate (Marine Benchmark and Brodin, 2016). 
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We have had the fortune to work with the forefront of shipping data and we can therefore 
make more accurate calculations. Hence we are able to estimate and predict hypothetical 
situations of compliance and non-compliance on a very precise level. The data is very 
accurate however, as previously mentioned, the data set does not show which type of fuel is 
being used it only states the amount of fuel consumed inside and outside of ECA. Our 
assumption in all the analysis is that the vessels use regulation classed fuel. This means that 
the vessels use 3.5% fuel outside and 1.0% fuel inside ECA before 2015-01-01 and 0.1% fuel 
inside ECA after 2015-01-01. 3.5% is the maximum Sulphur level allowed in the HFO fuel. It 
is possible that by assuming that all vessels use the 3.5% fuel outside an ECA has resulted in 
an overestimation of Sulphur emissions in our study. This assumption is a definite weakness 
in our analysis since the amount of Sulphur in for example HFO can vary from 3.5% to 2.3% 
depending on what is available.  
We suggest that further research should be done to find the vessels that skirt the regulation. 
The need to know what fuel the vessel is operating on at what time is needed for a more 
accurate depiction of the amount of Sulphur emitted in actuality. This will require a more 
accurate monitoring and enforcement method which most likely will not be available until the 
new monitoring system that MBAB is developing.   
 
7. Discussion  
7.1 The future of ECA’s 
The global market is showing no tendency of slowing down. People are constantly consuming 
more and the demand for supplies increase all around the world, this will most likely increase 
the demand on the shipping industry. This means that increased costs to the shipping industry 
will undoubtedly lead to higher prices for the consumer. In the long run it will push the 
industry towards new innovations and technology that will in turn reduce costs and gain a 
competitive advantage while still following the regulations. 
 
One of the biggest challenges the shipping industry will be facing is the introduction of the 
new Global Sulphur regulation. This new regulation will decrease the Global cap of Sulphur 
in the fuel used by vessels from 3.5% to 0.5% per ton. The date of implementation for the new 
global regulation will be decided in 2018 but it is estimated to come into force 2020 (IMO 3, 
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2016). This new regulation is not only threatening the shipping industry but also puts pressure 
on the production of low Sulphur fuels. If the oil industry is unable to supply the new low 
Sulphur fuel needed then the shipping industry will slow down if not grind to a halt.  
 
There have been multiple studies conducted, as previously mentioned, showing the effect of 
Sulphur on both individual’s health and the environment. The studies show how Sulphur 
emissions affect the respiratory system negatively and can lead to premature deaths. The 
environmental effects include global warming, increased acidification of oceans and 
environmental degradation. These findings have proved that the expansions of ECA’s are very 
vital for the protection of individuals and the environment. This is why the EU has decided to 
introduce ECA’s to all members bordering the sea. Asia will also be introducing an ECA for 
the first time. The new European ECA (EU 2020) can be seen in Diagram 4. 
    
 
 
There are also political implications associated with the new ECA introduction. The ECA 
cannot be extended all the way to Africa because it would intrude into Africa’s economic 
zone. This means that unless Africa decides to introduce an ECA of their own they will 
probably be exposed to higher amounts of Sulphur. The vessels will most likely travel along 
the African coast to avoid the European ECA in the Mediterranean ocean. This could be 
sending the message that “Europe exports Emissions to Africa to maximize profits” to the rest 
of the world. This opts for an interesting discussion between the EU and UN. Another 
consequence is the formation of a bottle neck in the Atlantic between Spain and Gran 
Canarias, which will increase the risk of vessels colliding.  
Diagram 4: EU 2020 ECA (All EU 
Waters).  
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In the paper by Chang et. al. from 2014 they have calculated the effect of a potential Asian 
ECA in the port of Incheon, Korea. They found that by using 0.1% fuel the emission could be 
reduced by up to 93%. Asia is the most populated continent in the world and at the same time 
has among the most trafficked ports in the world. The shipping industry undoubtedly has a 
very significant effect on individual health as well as the environment. This is why the 
introduction of an Asian ECA would be very beneficial. The new Asian ECA will cover Hong 
Kong, Shanghai and Beijing as can be seen in Diagram 5 below. 
 
 
With the expansion of ECA’s the appeal for alternative transport methods increase. Some of 
the examples include transporting goods by truck or train. According to the study by 
Panagakos et.al. (2013) the introduction of the new European ECA regulation in the might 
result in a change of transportation channels. They considered the option of transporting 
goods by truck. The full effect of this will not be seen until the new regulation is put into 
force. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 5: Asian ECA 
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7.2 Monitoring and enforcement methods under development 
 
We mentioned several time the importance of a monitoring and enforcement methods. 
Without this the effect of the regulations will be significantly diminished. That is why the 
following methods are being developed by MBAB: 
 
Emission Enforcement Support (EES): This method is related to a vessel’s fuel price 
consumption. MBAB’s calculated fuel consumption will be compared to the mandatory 
registration of fuel oil purchases. The level of non-compliance can be determined by the 
difference between the two metrics. This information will then be used to decide the penalty 
for non-compliance. Emission Certification of Compliance (ECC): This is a voluntary 
certification service, were the vessels register their Bunker receipts information. These 
receipts will be compared to the fuel consumption calculations made by MBAB, making it 
possible for pre-arrival inspections by authorities (Marine Benchmark and Brodin, 2016). 
 
The punishment for skirting the regulation has not yet been set by international organizations. 
To try and deter vessels from avoiding the regulation the punishment will have to be set at a 
level which will be far greater than the profits gained from skirting. The punishment would 
also have to cover the negative externalities that are associated with the increased amount of 
Sulphur released. The harsher the punishment the more likely there will be a level playing 
field.  
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Appendix 
 
Equation 1: The percentage of non-compliance distances	
 "#$%&'() + ("',&'()	* x%) = -).".'%ℎ	3.5%	4$)5 "',&'() − ("',&'()	* x%) = -).".'%ℎ	1%	#8	0.1%	4$)5	(():),(',;	#,	8);$5<%'#,) 
 
Equation 2: The equation for the additional amount of emission released for x% non-
compliance 
 
Total Sulphur Released –(-).".'%ℎ	3.5%	4$)5 * ( >?@?ABCDAEFG∗I,IKLMNOGPFQB	RAGONSB	RT	UVW )) – (-).".'%ℎ	1%	#8	0.1%	4$)5 ∗(XYZ	[$)5\$8,%∗0.01	#8	0.001"'&%<,])	^_`  ))= Increased Sulphur released with x% non-compliance 
 
 
Equation 3: The equation for profit gained for x% non-compliance:  
 
Original Cost -  (-)."aNGb	K.L%	TABC * ([$)5c&)(^_`∗XYZd8'])"'&%<,])	^_` )) - ((-).".'%ℎ	1%	#8	0.1% ∗([$)5c&)(Z$%&'()^_`∗e[Zd8'])"'&%<,])	Z$%&'()	^_` )) = Increased Profit for x% compliance 
 
Equation 4: Discounted price per ton cargo shipped  
 
Cheaper per ton = d8#4'%_<8;#	f,%<g) 
 
Equation 5: Total amount of Sulphur released (tons) Pre and post 2015-01-01 
 
Pre Total Sulphur Released = (Tons of HFO burnt * 0.035) + (Tons burnt MGO * 0.01) 
Post Total Sulphur Released = (Tons of HFO burnt * 0.035) + (Tons burnt MGO * 0.001) 
 
Equation 6: Total cost of voyage 
 
Total cost =( FuelPriceMGO * FuelUsedECA) +( FuelPriceHFO * FuelUsedOutside) 
 
Equation 7: Share of Distance 
hℎ<8)#4"'&%<,]) = "'&%<,])j8<k)5)(^_`j#%<5"'&%<,])j8<k)5)( 
 
